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Abstract 
The use of social media for sharing political information and the status of news as an 
essential raw material for good citizenship are both generating increasing public concern. We 
add to the debates about misinformation, disinformation, and “fake news” using a new 
theoretical framework and a unique research design integrating survey data and analysis of 
observed news sharing behaviors on social media. Using a media-as-resources perspective, 
we theorize that there are elective affinities between tabloid news and misinformation and 
disinformation behaviors on social media. Integrating four datasets we constructed during the 
2017 UK election campaign—individual-level data on news sharing (N=1,525,748 tweets), 
website data (N=17,989 web domains), news article data (N=641 articles), and data from a 
custom survey of Twitter users (N=1,313 respondents)—we find that sharing tabloid news on 
social media is a significant predictor of democratically-dysfunctional misinformation and 
disinformation behaviors. We explain the consequences of this finding for the civic culture of 
social media and the direction of future scholarship on fake news. 
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On Remembrance Sunday, 2016, two UK right-wing tabloid newspapers—the Sun and the 
Daily Mail—published photos on their websites and social media accounts of Labour Party 
leader Jeremy Corbyn “dancing a jig” as he made his way to the national remembrance 
ceremony at the Cenotaph memorial in central London. The Mail’s headline was: “Is this 
really the day to audition for Strictly [Come Dancing], Jeremy? Corbyn appears to dance a jig 
at the Cenotaph as he waits for the Remembrance Day parade” (Ponsford, 2016). The articles 
featured six individual photos of Corbyn, shot from some distance away and in quick 
succession. Positioned side by side on a single canvas, the images gave the impression that 
the Labour leader was performing a spontaneous “dance.” The framing was clear: here was 
Corbyn, the left-wing pacifist, showing casual disregard for those who lost their lives to war, 
and, by extension, those across the country participating in their own commemorations. The 
images were widely shared on social media. 
The problem? This news was fabricated. Corbyn had, in fact, been walking alongside 
one of his constituents, George Durack, a 92-year-old Second World War veteran. The 
tabloids’ picture editors had cropped the photos to exclude Durack. When the full images 
later emerged online, it was clear that Corbyn’s movements were simply the natural gestures 
of a person walking and talking with a companion. 
Links to the photos coursed through social media networks during Remembrance 
Sunday. Empowered by evidence of Corbyn’s supposed misdemeanor, many social media 
users eagerly circulated the false news among their networks, giving extended life to a 
factually baseless meme that still exists as we complete this article in early 2018. 
 
News sharing on social media: identifying uncivic outcomes 
Almost all theoretical perspectives on political communication rest on an ideal of the 
behaviors and contextual conditions that shape good citizenship. Dewey’s (1927) and 
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Habermas’s (1996) insistence on the importance of deliberation and learning are obvious 
cases, but even Lippman’s (1922) more skeptical insistence that individuals have irrational 
and self-serving motives when they communicate with others still relies on an ideal yardstick 
against which empirical reality is judged and found wanting. The healthy functioning of 
liberal democracies has long been said to rely upon citizens whose role is to learn about the 
social and political world, exchange information and opinions with fellow citizens, arrive at 
considered judgements about public affairs, and put these judgements into action as political 
behavior. It is equally beyond doubt that, since the onset of modernity, a key circulatory raw 
material for these acts of citizenship is news (Schudson, 1998). 
Yet the status of news as the raw material of good citizenship is currently undergoing 
something of a crisis. There are now fundamental questions about how the routine use of 
social media by news producers and citizens is reshaping the civic environments of the 
advanced democracies. Central to the debate is whether the affordances that enable news to 
rapidly circulate and recirculate also encourage political expression that is superficial, 
misleading, or false. What are the necessary ingredients, at both the systemic and individual 
levels, for falsehood to spread on social media? And when people do share information that 
misleads or deceives, what are the likely effects on the civic culture of life online? 
Emerging research on political misperceptions shows that many citizens hold 
factually incorrect beliefs about politics. But, as noted in a recent review article (Flynn, 
Nyhan and Reifler, 2017), little is known about the role of media, let alone social media, in 
enabling the spread of false information. Our concern in this article is whether the quality of 
civic culture in social media environments is affected by the routine presence of tabloid news 
sharing. We consider whether tabloid media are poisoning the well of social media by 
providing resources for news sharing behavior that is dysfunctional for democracy. Using a 
unique blend of survey data and digital trace data, we assess whether tabloid news has 
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elective affinities with online misinformation, which, following Jack (2017), we define as 
unintentional behavior that inadvertently misleads, and online disinformation, which we 
define as intentional behavior that purposively misleads. Overall, our findings shed light on 
the interdependence between media adaptation and changes in the character of civic life. We 
argue that democratically-dysfunctional news sharing behavior is a potential systemic 
outcome of the tabloidization of the UK social media environment. 
To understand the interdependence between digital platforms, tabloid news 
organizations, and social media users, we start from the premise that, more than ever before, 
news media provide resources for citizens to participate in politically-significant behaviors. 
As the “active audience” tradition in media research has amply shown, people use news to 
collectively construct everyday narratives to make sense of public events (for one example 
see Bird 1998). News sharing on social media is now an essential part of this process. 
However, we use the term media-as-resources to ground our study in an emergent conceptual 
mileu, to which we also seek to contribute. We assume that in a complex, multi-faceted 
media environment characterized by multi-directional information flows (Chadwick, 2017), 
primary gatekeeping by journalists, and secondary gatekeeping by users (Singer, 2014) 
research should pay attention to the ways in which individuals enrol specific types of news 
content as they seek to exercise political agency in the everyday spaces of social media. This 
perspective builds on Chadwick's (2017) view of media content as resources for intervening 
in the political information cycles of the hybrid media system, Couldry's (2012) treatment of 
how digital media are unique in the intensity with which they are implicated in everyday 
social practice, Bennett and Iyengar's (2008) call for a post-mass communication paradigm 
for understanding media effects, Shah et al's (2005) finding that there is a link between 
individuals’ traditional media consumption patterns and their propensity to become 
politically engaged online, and, finally, Edgerly et al's (2016) recent work on how individuals 
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appropriate existing media resources when they craft acts of political expression on 
Facebook. 
News producers, political elites, and citizens participate in webs of complex 
interdependence that problematize what were once clearly differentiated roles in the 
production and distribution of news (Chadwick, 2017a). While professional journalists 
maintain their primacy as the originators and selectors of news, citizens who share content 
online contribute to the visibility of news—whether true, false, or exaggerated (Singer, 
2014). In this environment, professionally-produced news not only reaches its audiences 
directly but also indirectly, when social media users share articles. 
 To date, the research on online news sharing has been almost entirely concerned with 
identifying the “factors for success” that make it more likely that news will be shared in the 
first place (Kümpel et al, 2015). In other words, sharing has mostly been treated as an 
outcome that can be predicted by a range of factors, such as emotional content (Papacharissi 
and de Fatima Oliveira, 2012); the presence of specific news frames (Valenzuela et al. 2017); 
the intensity of ongoing political events (Boczkowski and Mitchelstein, 2011); the 
characteristics of audience comments and ratings (Li and Sakamoto, 2014); and the role of 
elite users with large numbers of followers (Bakshy et al, 2011). Some work exists on the 
relationships between Facebook’s affordances and personal feelings of community and 
involvement (Oeldorf-Hirsch and Sundar, 2015) and there is a growing body of work on the 
factors that lead users to post comments on news articles, as opposed to share news (see for 
example Weber, 2013). 
 But most existing studies rely solely on publicly-available social media data and there 
is little research that seeks to understand people’s motivations for, and experiences of, 
sharing news. To our knowledge, no previous research has focused explicitly on the links 
between people’s motivations for sharing news, the types of news they share, and the quality 
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of behavior that results. No previous research has used the unique blend of survey data and 
data from observed news sharing behaviors of the kind we use here to study misinformation 
and disinformation. And no previous empirical research has focused on how different news 
sources might have elective affinities with people’s propensity to misinform and disinform 
others on social media. 
 
Misinformation and disinformation in comparative context: from fake news factories to 
tabloid news 
When the “fake news” scandal emerged during the 2016 US presidential campaign it was 
widely perceived as an alien threat to elite US journalistic norms of professionalism, 
accuracy, and objectivity (Carlson, 2017). There is no doubt that fake news is a significant 
problem but how well do US understandings of it travel to other countries? The “purest” 
forms of fake news—outright fabrications created by online news “factories” that exploit 
advertising syndication systems for financial gain—have so far been rare or nonexistent in 
many countries. And in any case purely fabricated news is just one part of a spectrum of 
behaviors and artifacts problematic for the maintenance of liberal democratic norms. For 
alongside fake news there is the everyday online production and circulation of information 
that is exaggerated, sensationalized, selective, or assembled from a web of partial truths in 
hybrid networks of reputable and less reputable sources (Chadwick, 2017a: 271–284; Rojecki 
and Meraz, 2014). 
If, as we argue, media are resources that people use to try to influence others on social 
media, in the UK the inconvenient truth is that key among the media that matter are articles 
published by large-circulation, mainstream tabloid outlets, whose daily stock-in-trade has 
always been news of dubious civic value. Tabloids have played significant roles in shaping 
British political life and there are few signs they are giving up their longstanding political 
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missions. In the run-up to the UK’s Brexit referendum in 2016, the right-wing tabloids the 
Sun, the Daily Mail, and the Daily Express strongly advocated for Britain’s exit from the 
European Union (Deacon et al, 2016) and their online work was an important part of their 
strategy. Analysis of the hundred most-shared news stories on social media about UK politics 
in 2016 revealed no evidence of fake news factories but a great deal of problematic content in 
tabloid newspapers (Waterson, 2017). The most glaring example was a piece of only 377 
words published by the Daily Express during the Brexit referendum campaign. Entitled 
“Major leak from Brussels reveals NHS will be KILLED OFF if Britain remains in the EU,” 
the article claimed that trade deals between the EU and the United States would result in the 
EU seeking to “end all forms of state intervention in competition with the private sector,” 
including, supposedly, the UK’s publicly funded and highly popular National Health Service. 
This was pure misrepresentation, and the European Commission publicly refuted it. And yet, 
this Express story became the single most-shared news article on social media during the 
Brexit referendum campaign, with 464,000 shares, comments, and interactions on Facebook 
(Waterson, 2017). 
Debate about the power exercised by the right-wing titles that dominate the UK press 
has been a perennial feature of general elections, popular commentary, and media scholarship 
since the 1970s (see for example Esser, 1999; McLachlan and Golding, 2000). In recent 
years, as print circulations have declined and new online news organizations such as Buzzfeed 
and the Huffington Post have reached mass audiences in the UK, it might seem that the era of 
tabloid dominance is drawing to a close. But the evidence suggests otherwise. As Table 1 
shows, tabloids now attract huge audiences to their websites and mobile news applications. 
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Table 1. Most-read UK newspaper titles in 2016 
 
Title Net print, 
PC, and 
mobile total 
monthly 
readership, 
de-
duplicated 
(millions) 
Average 
print 
monthly 
readership 
(millions) 
Average PC 
readership, 
November 
2016 (millions) 
Total mobile 
readership, 
November 
2016 
(millions) 
Type 
Daily Mail & 
dailymail.co.uk  
29.1 9.9 8.0 19.9 Tabloid 
The Sun & thesun.co.uk 26.2 10.1 2.8 19.0 Tabloid 
Daily Mirror & 
mirror.co.uk 
25.8 5.7 4.9 20.0 Tabloid 
The Guardian & 
theguardian.com 
22.7 4.1 7.7 17.2 Quality 
The Daily Telegraph & 
telegraph.co.uk 
21.4 3.8 7.3 15.2 Quality 
Independent.co.uk 16.9 0  4.4 14.4 Quality 
London Evening 
Standard & 
standard.co.uk 
11.3 5.2 1.9 7.0 Tabloid 
Daily Express & 
express.co.uk 
10.6 2.7 3.0 6.1 Tabloid 
Daily Star & 
dailystar.co.uk 
6.2 2.4 1.0 3.3 Tabloid 
The Times & 
thetimes.co.uk 
5.8 4.2 0.8 1.6 Quality 
 
Source: Ponsford, 2017/UK National Readership Survey 
 
Recent data also reveal tabloid news brands are thriving online, with the Mail, the 
Sun, and the Mirror all featuring in the top five online news sites by digital audience reach 
(OFCOM, 2017). As Figure 1 shows, the Mail and the Sun now reach about two thirds of the 
UK’s total digital audience in any given month. 
 
 
 
 
 9 
Figure 1. Top 5 UK online news entities in April 2017, by millions of monthly users and 
percentage of total UK digital audience reached 
 
 
 
 
Note: People 18 years and over, April 2017. Source: OFCOM, 2017. 
 
 
Of course, online there is plenty of ideologically-slanted news that does not originate 
with tabloids. A new generation of UK independent news websites such as Breitbart UK on 
the right and the Canary on the left contribute to this. As we later discuss, as part of our 
research for this article we also discovered that the Russian state broadcaster RT features 
prominently in political news sharing networks on UK Twitter. Yet, important as these 
developments are, we argue that any study of the civic effects of news in the UK should 
begin from a media-systemic context in which tabloids are successfully adapting to 
technologically-driven shifts in the consumption, production, and circulation of news. 
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Research questions and hypothesis 
To disentangle how tabloid news sharing might shape the quality of online civic culture, we 
focus on three key explanations: users’ motivations for sharing news on social media, the 
kinds of online networks in which users are embedded, and the types of media content they 
share. We explore whether these variables, together with a set of relevant controls, predict 
two behavioral outcomes: (1) sharing news on social media, either knowingly or 
unknowingly, that was either exaggerated or made up, and (2) being told by others on social 
media that the news one shared was not fully accurate, was exaggerated, or was made up.  
 We begin by asking RQ1: What motivations for sharing news on social media predict 
users’ democratically-dysfunctional news sharing? and RQ2: What motivations for sharing 
news on social media predict being challenged by others for having engaged in 
democratically-dysfunctional news sharing? 
News sharing on social media must also be considered in light of the relational 
context in which it occurs. When deciding whether to publish political messages, people 
consider whether members of their networks agree or disagree with their opinions (Vraga et 
al, 2015). Users may feel benevolent toward like-minded others and less inclined to deceive 
them, but they may also be less careful with what they share because they do not expect to be 
challenged. Conversely, people in more conflictual networks may be more willing to 
exaggerate and deceive to correct what they perceive as a hostile environment (Rojas, 2010), 
but the feeling of being in a minority may also constrain their expression (Askay, 2015) and 
caution them against sharing news whose veracity may be questioned. At the same time, 
accusing others of spreading exaggeration and falsehoods tends to generate conflict, and 
users who generally engage with conflictual networks may become used to dissonant 
interactions and not worry about avoiding confrontation (Vraga et al, 2015).  
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In light of this range of potential expectations, we ask RQ3: What relationship is there 
between levels of agreement and disagreement in users’ online networks and their 
engagement in democratically-dysfunctional news sharing? and RQ4: What relationship is 
there between levels of agreement and disagreement in users’ online networks and their 
being challenged for having engaged in democratically-dysfunctional news sharing? 
Next, using our media-as-resources perspective, we assess how different types of 
media sources might have elective affinities with problematic news sharing. Given our theory 
about the role of tabloids we reason that the more that users share tabloid news sources, the 
more likely they are to misinform and disinform others. Some news sharers on social media 
may be relatively careless about the truth of the information they share, while others may 
maliciously intend to deceive others. For both sets of users, tabloid news provides a fertile 
context of widely available, factually loose, exaggerated or false news. By the same token, 
we reason that sharing tabloid news is also likely to increase the probability of being 
challenged by other users. And an important issue in the debate about the problematic quality 
of online expression is whether the interpersonal networks of social media offer useful 
opportunities for correcting false or misleading information (Bode and Vraga, 2015; 
Margolin et al, 2017). Thus we formally hypothesize that (H1) the more that users share 
tabloid news on social media, the more likely they are to engage in democratically-
dysfunctional news sharing (H1a) and be challenged by users in their social media networks 
for doing so (H1b). 
 
Research strategy, data, and design 
We adopted a novel, hybrid methods approach that used Twitter as a field site. By 2016, 25 
percent of the British population used Twitter, making it second only to Facebook in usage 
for news (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2017). To summarize, we integrated 
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the analysis of large-scale, individual-level social media data (N=1,525,748 tweets), website 
data (N=17,989 web domains), and news article data (N=641 articles) with our own, custom-
designed survey of Twitter users (N=1,313 respondents). Our Online Appendix contains 
additional detail on our methods.1 
 We wanted to study users who had shared a range of types of news including tabloid 
news. Thus our first chosen population was Twitter users who, during the 2017 UK general 
election campaign, shared at least one news article related to politics published in one of the 
five most-read UK national tabloids: the Daily Mail, the Sun, the Daily Mirror, the Daily 
Express, and the Daily Star. We monitored these newspapers’ websites for a week during the 
campaign (May 15–22, 2017) and recorded every article they published about UK politics. 
This resulted in a dataset of 641 news articles. To identify all the tweets that contained links 
to these articles we extracted the articles’ hyperlinks and queried Twitter’s Search API for 
tweets containing the links. In all, we found 83,881 tweets (including retweets) that linked to 
one of those articles. These tweets were posted by 28,552 unique users, a population we 
filtered to exclude likely bots, highly automated, and organizational accounts.2 Filtering 
yielded a population of 19,248 unique Twitter users.  
We augmented this initial population of tabloid news sharers with a population of 
Twitter users who followed at least one of the five tabloids but who had not tweeted a link to 
any tabloid articles. This enabled us to include data for both actual and potential tabloid news 
sharers. After filtering these follower lists to exclude likely bots, highly automated, and 
organizational accounts we had a second sample of 20,391 users.  
We then used an automated method to send survey invitations via personalized 
Twitter @messages to all users in both samples (19,248 + 20,391). Users were invited to take 
our survey from June 5 to June 8, 2017 and we kept it open until June 11, three days after 
election day. Fully 1,422 users completed our survey—a participation rate of 3.6%, in line 
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with previous research based on similar methods (Vaccari, Chadwick and O’Loughlin, 2015; 
Chadwick, O’Loughlin and Vaccari, 2017). We only included in our analysis the 1,313 
respondents who correctly answered an attention verification question. Of these, 1,066 had 
tweeted at least one tabloid article and 247 followed a tabloid account but had not tweeted 
any articles. Table A1 in our Online Appendix shows descriptive statistics for our sample and 
a comparison with a benchmark survey of a sample representative of the UK voting age 
population. The results of the benchmark survey show that our survey respondents were 
similar to those among the general UK online public who post political content on social 
media. 
 
Outcome variables: misinformation, disinformation, and correction 
Following the Pew Research Center’s 2016 report on attitudes to fake news (Barthel, 
Mitchell and Holcomb, 2016) our survey asked: “Sometimes people might share news on 
social media that turns out not to be fully accurate or is exaggerated. In the past month, do 
you recall sharing a news story that…” Individuals could choose up to four among the 
following responses: “Seemed accurate at the time, but you later found was made up” (scored 
1); “Was exaggerated, and you were not aware of this” (scored 2); “Was exaggerated, and 
you were aware of this” (scored 3); “You thought was made up when you shared it” (scored 
4). Respondents who did not choose any of the above responses were scored as 0. We rank-
ordered the different behaviors to build a scale ranging from no reported dysfunctional news 
sharing (0), through misinformation to the most egregious offense of disinformation (4). This 
allowed us to place respondents on a five-point scale of dysfunctionality. (Respondents who 
selected more than one option were placed at the level in the scale corresponding to the most 
dysfunctional behavior they reported.) We reasoned that when a person shares news that 
seemed accurate at the time but which they subsequently found was made up, this is the 
 14 
lesser problem: it does not imply intentionality in the original moment and indicates a person 
at least bothers to make themselves aware that a story was misleading. At the other end of the 
scale lies the most problematic behavior—sharing news that a person thought was made up 
when they shared it. This reveals a willfully cavalier attitude to the truth. 
Our second measure assesses the reactions people receive when they share 
misinformation and disinformation. We asked: “In the past month, do you recall being told 
by anyone on social media that the news you shared on social media was not fully accurate or 
exaggerated?” Respondents could choose one among four answers, and we built a four-point 
scale with the responses: “No, I do not recall that” (scored 0); “Yes, I was told the news I had 
shared was not fully accurate” (scored 1); “Yes, I was told the news I had shared was 
exaggerated” (scored 2), and “Yes, I was told the news I had shared was completely made 
up” (scored 3). As with our first outcome variable, we reasoned that if a person is told by 
others that the news they shared was “not fully accurate,” this entails a less direct challenge 
than being told it was exaggerated. Highest on the scale is when a person is told by others 
that the news they shared was “completely made up.” As we shall see, this response was 
chosen by a surprisingly large number of respondents. 
 
Explanatory variables I: motivations for sharing news on social media—
persuading/informing, debating, and entertaining/trolling 
To understand people’s motivations when they share political news, our survey asked: “When 
you share news about British politics on social media, how important are these different goals 
to you? To inform others, influence others, entertain others, upset others, please others, 
provoke discussions, or find out other people’s opinions.” Respondents were asked to 
evaluate each goal on a four-point scale from “not at all important” (0) to “very important” 
(3); we also included a “don’t know” option. 
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To see how these seven motivations clustered we performed a principal component 
analysis on the responses. The results revealed three clear motivational clusters (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Principal component analysis of motivations for sharing news on social media 
 
Motivation Components 
 Entertaining/
Trolling 
Debating Persuading/ 
Informing 
To inform others   0.714 
To influence others   0.666 
To find out other people's opinions  0.7286  
To provoke discussions  0.6546  
To entertain others 0.5807   
To please others 0.5841   
To upset others 0.5169   
    
Eigenvalues 2.13682 1.24056 1.03073 
Cumulative variance explained 0.3053 0.4825 0.6297 
 
Note: With Varimax Rotation. Coefficients lower than 0.40 are not shown. N=1,124 
 
We term these three motivations persuading/informing, debating, and 
entertaining/trolling. The first two labels are relatively straightforward but our use of the 
term entertaining/trolling for the clustered motivations to entertain, please, and upset others is 
perhaps less so. Trolling is a contested and context-dependent term that captures multiple 
practices, some of which are positive for preserving norms such as freedom of expression, 
open debate, and social experimentation. Nevertheless, if we think about a continuum of 
positive to negative online political behavior, we suggest trolling is comparatively negative, 
and it is all the more important to be clear about this in a so-called “post-truth” context. 
Phillips’ (2015) detailed study showed that trolls maintain their identity by seeking to 
entertain themselves and others. They crave social approval and seek to impress with the 
visible traces of their disruption. Given that the motivations to entertain and please clustered 
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strongly with the motivation to upset we believe the label entertaining/trolling captures an 
important and relatively democratically-dysfunctional motivation for news sharing.3 
 
Explanatory variables II: levels of disagreement in a user’s online networks 
To assess whether our respondents tend to discuss politics on social media with likeminded 
or non-likeminded others, we asked: “Let us think about the people with whom you normally 
discuss British politics on social media. How many of them would you say you normally 
agree or disagree with?” Respondents could choose among five categories, ranging from 
complete agreement to complete disagreement. Those who expressed full or partial 
agreement were coded as 1; those who claimed to encounter balanced views were coded as 0; 
and those who reported disagreement with most or all of their networks were coded as -1. We 
excluded respondents who answered “I do not discuss British politics on social media” and 
“Don’t know.” 
 
Explanatory variables III: digital trace data for types of news shared by our survey 
respondents  
Surveying Twitter users meant we were able to collect the tweets our respondents had posted 
and identify the news types they actually shared on Twitter. The day after the election, we 
queried the Twitter Search API to collect the maximum possible number of publicly available 
tweets for each respondent—the last 3,200 per person. Because we treated news types shared 
as an explanatory variable we restricted our analysis to tweets posted from the beginning of 
the election campaign up until the day before we fielded our survey (April 18–June 4). This 
yielded 1,525,748 tweets posted by 1,289 survey respondents.4 Of these 1.53 million tweets, 
776,880 contained one or more hyperlinks. We extracted the web domain names from these 
hyperlinks and established that respondents had shared links from 17,989 unique web 
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domains. But the list of shared domains had a classic long-tail distribution: just 329 domains 
accounted for 90 percent of all the domains our users shared. We therefore decided to rank 
order the domains according to the number of tweets that linked to them and the number of 
our survey respondents who had shared them.  
 We then excluded domains that were not news sites and classified the 50 top-ranked 
domains in our index by news type. We distinguished between broadcasters, quality 
newspapers, tabloid newspapers, international news, online-native news, and state 
broadcasters. Together, these top 50 domains accounted for 127,600 URLs shared in tweets 
by our respondents. Due to the skewed distribution of the shared news variables, we took the 
log of the numbers of tweets, after adding 1 so that users who had shared no tweets from any 
category would still be included in our analyses. The calculated rankings and the full list of 
the top 50 news sources, together with their classifications, can be found in Table A2 in our 
Online Appendix.5 Our respondents clearly shared from a wide variety of news outlets, most 
of which were not tabloids. Although we do not claim that our sample is fully representative 
of Twitter users, equally, it goes well beyond those who only read and share tabloid news 
online. 
 
Control variables: socio-demographics and political attitudes 
Finally, we integrated the two most important sources of data we had gathered about our 
sample of Twitter users—their survey responses and the number of tweets they had shared 
linking to each of the six news types—and entered these into ordered logistic regression 
models. We imputed missing data to ensure our analyses did not suffer from biases due to 
listwise deletion.6 
 Our models controlled for a range of variables. Given the particular demographics of 
tabloid readers and Twitter users, we controlled for gender, age, income, and education. As 
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our sample included users who shared political news, we controlled for political attitudes 
such as interest in politics, political efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy. Since each 
tabloid has specific partisan leanings and because strong partisans are more willing to believe 
false information confirming their preferences (Flynn, Nyhan and Reifler, 2017: 131–137), 
we control for users’ ideology and ideological extremism (measured as ideology squared). 
 
Findings and Discussion 
We first present some descriptive statistics on dysfunctional news sharing behavior. As Table 
3 shows, a surprisingly large number of our respondents admitted to democratically-
dysfunctional news sharing. 
 
Table 3. Misinformation and disinformation as democratically-dysfunctional news 
sharing behaviors 
 
Shared news on social media in the past month that* Frequency Percent 
0. No response selected 391 32.3 
1. Seemed accurate at the time, but you later found was made up 362 29.9 
2. Was exaggerated, and you were not aware of this 379 31.3 
3. Was exaggerated, and you were aware of this 207 17.1 
4. You thought was made up when you shared it 108 8.9 
Total 1,210  
   
Was in the past month told by anyone on social media that Frequency Percent 
0. I do not recall being told any of these 779 64.9 
1. The news I had shared was not fully accurate 221 18.4 
2. The news I had shared was exaggerated 107 8.9 
3. The news I had shared was completely made up 94 7.8 
Total 1,201 100 
 
* Percentages do not add up to 100 because more than one response could be selected. 
 
 
Fully two-thirds (67.7 percent) admitted to having shared news that was problematic 
in some way in the past month. In particular, 8.9 percent admitted to having willfully shared 
news that was made up and 17.1 percent willfully shared news that was exaggerated. More 
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than a third (35.1 percent) also reported being challenged for sharing news that was not fully 
accurate, was exaggerated, or was made up. The extent of these behaviors is disturbing. The 
limitations of our sample notwithstanding, these results reveal that democratically-
dysfunctional news sharing behavior is common practice for significant numbers of UK 
Twitter users who share political news on social media. But, turning to our regression 
analysis, what are the factors that explain these outcomes? 
As the left panel of Table 4 shows, tabloid news media play a significant role in 
enabling democratically-dysfunctional news sharing behavior. The number of tabloid news 
articles shared on Twitter is a positive and significant predictor of the likelihood of reporting 
sharing news on social media that was either exaggerated or fabricated. This finding supports 
the first part of our hypothesis (H1a) that the more users share tabloid news on social media, 
the more likely they are to engage in democratically-dysfunctional news sharing. There were 
no significant associations between dysfunctional behavior and sharing news from any other 
news types. As we theorized, there are elective affinities between mainstream UK tabloid 
sources and news sharing that results in misinformation and disinformation. 
The relationship between tabloids and dysfunctional news sharing becomes clearer 
still if we consider a hypothetical respondent whose characteristics are equal to the mean 
values in the variables included in Table 4 (apart from the number of tabloid news articles 
shared). If a statistically-average respondent shared just one tabloid news story in the entire 
47-day period for which we analyzed tweets, our model estimates that there is a 62 percent 
probability that this respondent would have reported dysfunctional news sharing behavior of 
some kind. The probabilities of this average respondent committing the most serious offenses 
in our scale—knowingly sharing news that is exaggerated or false—are estimated at 10 
percent and 6 percent, respectively. If an average respondent shared one tabloid news story 
Table 4. Explaining democratically dysfunctional-news sharing behaviors 
 
 Sharing misinformation and 
disinformation 
Being challenged for sharing 
misinformation and disinformation  
Coef. Std. Err. p Coef. Std. Err. p 
Gender 0.068 0.113 0.547 0.035 0.131 0.789 
Age 0.007 0.004 0.103 -0.001 0.005 0.824 
Income -0.001 0.010 0.926 0.000 0.011 0.985 
Education -0.011 0.041 0.794 -0.078 0.046 0.091 
Interest in politics 0.092 0.125 0.464 -0.143 0.149 0.339 
Political efficacy -0.075 0.051 0.140 -0.010 0.059 0.861 
Satisfaction with democracy 0.070 0.063 0.264 -0.064 0.073 0.382 
Ideology -0.057 0.037 0.122 0.008 0.041 0.848 
Ideology (quadratic term) 0.010 0.017 0.546 0.023 0.018 0.199 
Agreement/disagreement in social media networks -0.069 0.094 0.462 -0.226* 0.106 0.034 
Motivation: persuading/informing -0.114* 0.047 0.016 -0.002 0.056 0.972 
Motivation: debating 0.082* 0.033 0.014 0.066 0.039 0.093 
Motivation: entertaining/trolling 0.105*** 0.031 0.001 0.030 0.035 0.401 
Sharing misinformation or disinformation    0.307*** 0.048 0.000 
Shared news from (logged values)       
State broadcaster 0.141 0.093 0.130 -0.031 0.108 0.774 
Broadcaster -0.034 0.081 0.672 0.133 0.094 0.157 
International 0.012 0.058 0.836 0.052 0.066 0.432 
Online native 0.024 0.071 0.739 0.056 0.085 0.509 
Quality newspapers -0.119 0.073 0.102 -0.019 0.086 0.829 
Tabloid newspapers 0.164* 0.076 0.030 -0.063 0.090 0.484 
       
N 1,201   1,190   
F 2.29   3.33   
p(F) 0.000   0.000   
 
Note: ***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤.05. We do not report the conventional goodness of fit statistic (Log-likelihood) because it cannot be computed for analyses based 
on multiply imputed data.
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per day (i.e. 47 stories in total), our model estimates there is a 72 percent probability that they 
would report dysfunctional news sharing, while, again, the two most severe offenses—
knowingly sharing news that is exaggerated or false—are estimated at 15 percent and 10 
percent respectively.7 If we consider the massive scale of social media networks, it is clear 
from our findings that, on social media, there is a great deal of democratically-dysfunctional 
news sharing in relation to UK politics and tabloid articles are an essential ingredient in it. 
In contrast, we found no evidence that sharing news from online-native news sites 
predicted dysfunctionality. In the fallout from the 2017 UK general election there was much 
discussion about the growth of sensationalism in online political news as a result of the 
popularity of new, ideologically-slanted news sites such as, for example, Breitbart UK and 
Westmonster on the right and the Canary and Evolvepolitics on the left. There is also an 
ongoing debate about the contributions to civic life of the so-called “clickbait” general 
interest online-native sites such as Buzzfeed and the Huffington Post (Scacco and Muddiman, 
2016). Equal concern has been expressed about whether the Russian state broadcaster RT acts 
as a propaganda arm of the Kremlin, distributing news aimed at destabilizing the West. 
Online-native news sites featured prominently in the top 50 most-shared news sources among 
our respondents, as did RT, which confirms that the latter has become a widely-shared 
political source on Twitter in the UK. It is striking, however, that among our respondents, 
sharing online-native sources and sharing RT (the only state broadcaster in our top 50 
sources) had no statistically-significant relationships with misinformation and disinformation 
behaviors. Only mainstream UK tabloid newspapers attained that dubious status. 
Table 4 shows that all clusters of motivations for sharing news predict dysfunctional 
behavior and with statistically significant coefficients, providing an answer to our first 
research question. But while entertaining/trolling and debating are positively associated with 
dysfunctionality, persuading/informing is negatively associated with it. In other words, those 
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who are motivated to entertain/troll and debate with others are more likely to engage in 
misinformation and disinformation when they share news. Those who seek to 
persuade/inform others are less likely to do so. 
That the motivation to entertain/troll predicts misinformation and disinformation 
behaviors is unsurprising. In essence, these are people’s motivations being fulfilled by their 
behavioral rewards. Still, it is the relatively weak civic character of this behavior that we 
argue ought to be of concern. The goals that comprise this motivational cluster—to entertain, 
please, or upset others—are all focused on eliciting emotional responses. For these users, 
news sharing is not about seeking to inform others; the quality of the news they share appears 
to be unimportant. Indeed, perhaps the more sensational, ludicrous, or exaggerated the news 
is, the better it fits with the motivation to disrupt the rationality and veracity upon which 
political discussion must, in the final reckoning, depend. Of course, the motivation to 
entertain others may be civic in orientation. There is now a body of research on the role of 
political comedy in promoting engagement (for a good overview see Delli Carpini, 2012). 
However, this work has overwhelmingly focused on broadcast television shows, whose satire 
fundamentally depends on a baseline of factuality and tightly-scripted and professionally-
produced texts—the broadcasts—from which audiences might learn about politics. Social 
media provide a much looser context, where the choice of media-as-resources is much greater 
and where there are far more diverse opportunities for sharing problematic news content, 
should a user be motivated to do so. In this context, we caution against interpreting the 
outcomes of the entertaining/trolling motivation as unalloyed civic goods. 
That said, our results do reveal a positive and significant relationship between the 
motivation to debate with others and democratically-dysfunctional news sharing. Clearly, 
users with more civically-oriented motivations than entertaining/trolling still tend to mobilize 
news for misinformation and disinformation on social media. But if misinformation and 
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disinformation are an essential part of the repertoire of those who seek to debate with others, 
we suggest this might reveal a “race to the bottom” in online discourse. Those motivated to 
debate may see sharing problematic news as a cultural norm; a practice that is simply part of 
“what it takes” to engage politically on social media in order to attract attention and nudge 
others to take positions. This raises the worrying possibility that there might be a social 
media logic of sharing exaggerated and fabricated news and that this logic shapes the 
behavior even of those who begin from relatively civic motivations. 
Our findings also reveal that the levels of agreement and disagreement in users’ social 
media networks do not predict whether a user will engage in dysfunctional news sharing. The 
coefficient for this variable is not significant in the left panel of Table 4. This answers our 
third research question. However, levels of network agreement and disagreement do play a 
role in correcting dysfunctional behavior when it occurs. The coefficient for networks is 
negative and significant in the right panel of Table 4, which indicates that users are more 
likely to be challenged for their democratically-dysfunctional behavior if they tend to discuss 
politics on social media with people with whom they disagree, answering our fourth research 
question. It is possible to imagine plenty of scenarios in which political disagreement 
between the ideologically-divided leads to factual disputes or accusations that a news article 
is exaggerated. Over time, this might make people think twice about the quality of the news 
they decide to share. However, the logical downside—and it is a big downside—is that the 
more people engage with users who are politically like-minded, the less likely it is that they 
will face challenges for dysfunctional behavior. 
We find some further evidence of corrective behavior. To provide an initial test of the 
second part of our hypothesis (H1b) that the more dysfunctional news sharing behaviors users 
engage in, the more likely they are to be challenged, in Table 4 we included as an 
independent variable (see left panel) the scale of dysfunctional news sharing that was the 
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dependent variable in the central panel. The coefficient for this variable is positive and 
significant, thus confirming our hypothesis. There appears on the surface to be a healthy and 
intuitive connection between dubious behavior and receiving reprimands.  
At the same time, however, we must stress that large numbers of respondents who 
engaged in dysfunctional news sharing did not recall being challenged at all. Our model 
estimates that a statistically-average respondent who engaged in the most dysfunctional 
behavior of disinformation—knowingly sharing fabricated news—had only a 52 percent 
probability of being challenged in any way. And this is as good as it gets, because the 
probability of the statistically-average respondent being challenged for committing the less 
serious act of knowingly sharing news that was merely exaggerated is 43 percent. 
Misinformation, while still common, was also quite likely to go unchallenged. Those who 
said they shared news that was exaggerated but were not aware that it was at the time had a 
39 percent probability of being challenged, while those who shared news that seemed 
accurate at the time but who later found it was completely made up had only a 23 percent 
probability of being challenged. Social media correction is an imperfect mechanism. Yes, the 
most egregious behaviors are more likely to be countered but there are plenty of acts of 
misinformation and disinformation that receive no reprimands. 
Finally, and most troublingly, we find no statistically-significant relationships 
between users’ motivations (persuading/informing, debating, and entertaining/trolling) and 
the probability of their being challenged by others for dysfunctional news sharing. This 
answers our second research question. Equally, there is no correlation between the news 
types respondents shared and the likelihood of being challenged by others (H1). This means 
that those with the strongest motivations to behave in democratically-dysfunctional ways on 
social media and those who shared more tabloid news, which we have shown plays a role in 
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enabling dysfunctional behaviors, are not more likely to be challenged by people in their 
social media networks.  
 
Conclusion 
In the contemporary media environment, understanding how news affects citizens’ 
knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors requires that we account for the multiple mechanisms by 
which content travels—directly, from news organizations to audiences, and indirectly, 
through sharing by ordinary users on digital media platforms. It also requires that we explain 
why different types of citizens share different types of news and how both social media 
affordances and media content enable citizens to achieve their goals. Tackling these questions 
requires innovative research designs that combine analysis of news media content, self-
reports from relevant groups of social media users, and digital trace data, as we have done in 
this study. 
We find that UK tabloid newspapers negatively affect the quality of civic life on 
social media because they provide a fertile context for misinformation and resources for 
disinformation. During the 2017 UK general election campaign two-thirds (67.7 percent) of 
our respondents admitted to sharing problematic news on social media, which shows that this 
phenomenon is widespread but also that people are at least prepared to acknowledge their 
responsibility when asked in a survey. But most significantly, the more that users shared 
tabloid news articles on Twitter, the more likely they were to share news that was 
exaggerated or made up. There was no relationship between such democratically-
dysfunctional behavior and sharing news from other sources—quality newspapers, 
broadcasters, online-native news sites, international news, not even the Russian state 
broadcaster RT. 
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Equally troubling is our finding that the more users engage with politically like-
minded others online, the less likely it is that they will be challenged for dysfunctional 
behavior. Over the longer term, these people are less likely to encounter the kind of 
opposition that might make a difference to the quality of the news they share. At the systemic 
level, this raises the worrying prospect that the homophily that characterizes some, though by 
no means all (Barberá et al, 2015), political networks on social media may, in part, be 
animated by news sharing based on misinformation and disinformation. This might not be 
such a problem so long as homophilic networks remain small and politically marginal. But if 
this is the typical experience of large numbers of individuals on social media—and the size of 
tabloid reach online indicates that large numbers are involved—norms of correction are 
unlikely to become widely embedded. Over time, this may lead to low levels of awareness of 
the quality of different news types, a damaging cultural expectation that “anything goes” 
when sharing news online, and the impossibility of establishing a common ground of facts 
that enable citizens to engage in meaningful discussion across political divides. In short, 
animated by tabloid news, politics on social media may become a shouting match—of the 
deaf. 
While it is heartening that more seriously dysfunctional behavior—the intentional 
sharing of news that is exaggerated or fabricated—is more likely to be challenged by other 
social media users, there is, nevertheless, a startlingly high probability that dysfunctional 
sharing will go unchallenged. And users motivated to entertain/troll are not more likely to be 
reprimanded for their behavior. Social media remains an imperfect mechanism for correcting 
behavior that undermines civic culture online. Our findings suggest that the tragedy of the 
social media commons is that the correction of misinformation and disinformation is more 
likely to fail in precisely those circumstances when correction is most needed. 
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Our study has broader implications for the functioning of democracy. At the systemic 
level, tabloid newspaper logics are now integrating with social media logics and enabling 
people to spread misinformation and disinformation. This leads to dysfunctional sharing 
behaviors even among more civic-minded social media users. According to our media-as-
resources perspective, the raw materials for misinformation and disinformation must come 
from somewhere, and news is always likely to be central to this process. But when the quality 
of those external sources is relatively poor, and the sharing of those sources is linked to 
behavior that erodes civic culture online, we should be concerned. Future research could shed 
further light on the manifold aspects of what we see as the indirect, distributed tabloidization 
of the UK’s and other countries’ social media environments. 
A final point concerns the need to broaden the range of factors we consider in the 
ongoing debate about misinformation and disinformation. In the US context, the fake news 
crisis of 2016 was rightly met with calls for a restatement of the values of professional 
journalism. As our study shows, however, in some countries the content produced by some 
professional media outlets might be significant in the diffusion of misinformation and 
disinformation. Debates about fake news ought to pay attention to how hybrids of older and 
newer media—in this case social media combined with digitally-adaptive tabloid media—can 
explain democratically-dysfunctional online behavior. Thus, the role of elite and nonelite 
media, the specific features of national media systems, and the motivations and behaviors of 
ordinary social media users should all feature in future debates about the democratic quality 
of news. 
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